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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
IIARVEY BURTON
HATHAWAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vsJOHN \V. TURNER, 'Varden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
12858

Defendant-Respo1ldent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATElUENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Harvey Burton Hathaway1 appeals from a decision in the Third .Tudicial District
Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On November 26, 1971, Harvey Burton Hathaway filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that his confinement by respondent was invalid
and illegal. The matter came on for hearing on February 24, 1972, before Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
who denied the writ.
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RELIEI•" SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, John ';V. Turner, seeks affirmation of the decision of the court below to deny the writ.
STATEl\lENT OF FACTS
On l\Iay IO, I 965, an information charging Harvey Uurton Hathaway with murder in the first degree
was fi]ed in the Sixth Judicial District Court (Exhibit
2}. This information was based on evidence presented
in a preliminary hearing held l\lay 8, 1965, in OrderviJle, Utah. That evidence included a voluntary written
and signed statement by defendant that he had intentionaJly shot a man many times so that he could rob
him (Preliminary llearing Record, Exhibit I, p. 67,
76.) Appellant's attorneys, l\Ir. l\Iattson and l\fr. Vernieu, expressed doubts as to llathaway's chances of
acquittal (R. 42} and began negotiations with the prosecuting attorney. It was agreed that the charge would
be reduced to second degree murder if Hathaway woQld
plead guilty to that charge (R. 60).
l\Ir. l\Iattson testified that he and l\1r. Vernieu had
a number of conferences with appellant in which he was
advised of the nature of the charges against him, the
penalties that could be imposed, the possibilities of
acquittal, possible defenses, and the results of a guilty
verdict ( R. 56) .
IIathaway was informed of the plea negotiations
and was fully advised of the penalties for first and
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second degree murder. lie knew that he had a constitutional right to a trial and that a guilty plea would
mean no trial (R. 60). His choice of pleas was
thoroughly discussed, and he was given a "day or two"
to think the decision over ( R. 60-61). Hathaway decided that if he could get the charge reduced, he would
plead guilty to second degree murder (R. 61).
Mr. .Mattson further testified that he and Mr.
Vernieu were successful in communicating with Hathaway (R. 62), and that he was not aware of any difficulty in communicating with appellant when he was
discussing the different degrees of murder and the possible penalties with him ( R. 63, 64) .
The record further shows that appellant underwent two independent examinations, one by the state
mental hospital and another by a private psychiatrist.
Both found him to be sane ( R. 57-58).
:Mr.
also testified that manslaughter was
never mentioned (R. 61, 63), and that although it was
possible that the other attorney talked to Hathaway,
when he was not present, he and :Mr. V ernieu were in
constant contact during the entire case ( R. 64) .
Hathaway testified there had been a whole week
of meetings and discussions with his attorneys (R. 37),
that they had explained his constitutional rights regarding trial (R. 42), the different degrees of murder, and
the various consequences of being convicted of them
(R. 52).

4

On August :n, l!>G5, Harvey Burton llathaway
pleaded guilty to second degree murder ( Rxhihit 2).
A ppeJlant testified that it was difficult to remember
what he thought the day he entered the plea (U. 41, 51),
but that he thought he was pleading guilty to "manslaugther or maybe even second degree." (R. 40). The
l\linute Entry of the court shows that appellant was
accompanied by counsel at the time of the plea, and
that he was given a sentence of ten years to life (Exhibit 2).
Petitioner also testified that a week later he saw a
copy of his commitment order and noted that it read,
2nd degree murder ( R. 41) . Neither the conviction nor
the sentence was appealed.
Six years later, on November 26, 1971, IIathaway
filed a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his plea of
guilty was not made knowingly and intelligently.
ARGUl\iIENT
POINT I
TIIE COURT BELO'V DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
A WRIT 01•-.. HABEAS CORPUS AS APPELLANT IIAS F A I L E D TO .MEET IIIS
BURDEN TO ESTABLISI-I THAT HIS PLEA
OF GUILTY 'VAS NOT ENTERED KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY.
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Appellant's brief seems to reflect somewhat of a
misconception of the law in this area. The events in
question took place in 1965 while Boyldn v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 ( 1969) was not decided until 1969. Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, ft. note 4 states that
Boyl•in has not been applied retroactively by the Supreme Court.
In Arbuckle v. Turner, 306 F. Supp. 825 ( 1969),
the issue of the retroactivity of Boykin was raised, and
the United States District Court for Utah held that
Royli:in should not be applied retroactively. That case
was upheld by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Arbuclde v. 'l'nrner, 440
586, 588 (1971).
Therefore, although this case is subject to the rule
that a guilty plea must he made voluntarily and understandingly, it is not subject to the rule of the Boykin
decision which states that it cannot be presumed from a
silent record that a plea was entered voluntarily.
The burden of proof is on the appellant to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was not
made voluntarily and understandingly. McGuffee v.
'l'urncr, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 166 (1967).
This principle is well stated in JJ/axwell v. Turner,
20 Utah 2d 163, 435 P.2d 287 (1967). That case like
this one involved an appeal from a hearing in which
the appellant had claimed to have pleaded guilty involuntarily and the lower court had denied habeas corpus
relief. In affirming the denial, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
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"Proceedings in habeas corpus are generally regarded as ci\'il in nature an<l consequently follow the same rules of procedure as
in other cfril actions. In the original trial the
burden is on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts which will entitle him to relief. On appeal recognition is
gin·n to the prerogatives and the advantaged
position of the trial court. llis findings and
judgment are indulged a presumption of correctness. It is our duty to survey the evidence
in the light most favorable to them and not to
upset them if they find any substantial support in the evidence." Id. at 165.
The record of the proceedings in the trial court
in this case makes it c1ear that the decision is substantially supported by the evidence.
The record shows that the prosecution had a very
strong case against Hathaway which could have convicted him of first degree murder. IIathaway had made
a voluntury confession of the murder which was placed
in the preliminary hearing record (Exhibit I, p. 67-76),
his attorney stated that he felt that it was a "losing
case," (R. 42), and appellant himself stated, "I think
the facts stood for itself. There is no doubt that I did
it. There is no doubt at all, and everybody knows it."
(R. 40).
Because of almost certain conviction of first degree murder, appellant's attorneys negotiated a reduc-
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tion on the charge from first to second degree murder.
Hathaway's attorney testified that a reduction in the
charge to manslaughter was never discussed (R. 61,
63), and in view of the existing circumstances that
seems to be only logical, there is no reason why manslaughter should ever have been considered.
The record further shows that appellant was advised fully of his constitutional right to a trial, his
chances of acquittal, the consequences of conviction,
lus option to plead guilty to second degree murder, the
sentences that could be imposed, and that he was given
more than adequate counsel and time to reach an understanding decision (R. 56, 60, 61). Hathaway made the
only reasonable choice under the circumstances, and
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense (U. 61). The evidence further shows that he was present with both of
his attorneys at the time he pleaded guilty to second
degree murder and was sentenced to from ten years to
life (Exhibit 2). There is no evidence that appellant or
his counsel made any objection to the conviction or the
sentence at that time, or that there was any attempt to
appeal the conviction or the sentence. Hathaway had
another opportunity to raise an objection a week later
when he saw his commitment papers and noticed that
they read "2nd degree murder." (R. 41), but again no
objection was made.
The clear weight of the evidence seems to indicate
that IIathaway completely understood his situation and
his options and that he received exactly what he bar-

8

gained for. As has been noted, appellant has the burden
of proof to show that his guilty plea was not understandingly made, and yet he offers very little to meet
that burden and rehutt the clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. He admits that he had a whole
week of discussions with his attorneys (R. 37) and that
he was competently advised by them (R. 54) concerning his rights regarding a trial (R. 42), the different
degrees of murder and the consequences of being convicted of them (R. 52). Appellant attempts to meet his
whole burden of proof by the ambiguous statement,
"I'd have to say I thought it was a manslaughter
charge,. or maybe even a second degree, but I understood it was on its way down to a manslaughter charge."
( R. 40). At the same time, he admits that it was pretty
hard to remember what he thought the day he entered
the plea (R.41,51).
Clearly, appellant has not only failed to meet his
burden of proof to show that his plea was not made
understandingly, but the overwhelming weight of the
evidence is to the contrary. It plainly shows that the
plea was made intelligently and understandingly. There
can be little doubt that a,t the time of the plea Hathaway completely understood that he was pleading guilty
to second degree murder and that a sentence of ten
years to life could be imposed. The fact that now, seven
years later, he may no longer remember or understand
those proceeding is irrelevant.
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Appellant's brief raises several issues which are
claimed to be grounds for reversal in this case, which
clearly are not.
}"irst, appellant cites a :Missouri case. State v. fVilliams, 361 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1962) as authority for the
idea that a failure by the court to inquire of the defendant as well as his attorney concerning his plea is grounds
for reversal. Ilowever, itlachibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487 ( 1962), a Supreme Court decision was the
controlling law at that time. In that case, the court held
that the failure of the trial court to specifically inquire
at time of sentencing whether appellant personally
wished to make a statement in his own behalf was not
error of itself which could be raised to set aside sentence
(Id. at 511).
Appellant also argues that the slightest misunderstanding by the defendant as to the charges against him
or the sentnce that could be imposed would be sufficient
to allow withdrawal of the plea. Again, this is not necessarily true. In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440
P .2d 068 ( 1968) , Brown brought habeas corpus proceedings to seek the withdrawal of h!s guilty plea on
the grounds that he was inadequately advised of the
consequences of the plea. In denying his petition, the
Utah Supreme Court held that the accused was adequately advised of the consequences of his plea of
guilty where he was advised that he was charged with
a felony, that the charge was punishable by a prison
sentence, that he had the right to trial by jury and where
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the accused indicated his desire to waive trial and entered
the plea of guilty (Id. at 970).
Hathaway's case clearly meets these standards.
An Oregon case, Tucker v. Gladden, 245 Or. 109,
420 P .2d 625 ( 1966) said that the test of the validity
of a guilty plea is whether defendant understood the
nature of the crime to which he had pleaded and was
able to weigh this understanding against his own knowledge of the act he had performed; whether he knew of
some degree of the crime to which he did not plead or its
maximum sentence is irrelevant (Id. at 626). Again,
Hatha-way's case meets this standard .
.Appellant seeks to be allowed to withdraw his plea
se\ren years after sentence has been imposed. This request raises a serious issue as to the timeliness of the
attempt to withdraw it. As the Utah Supreme Court
stated in State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383
( 1946), "unless timely withdrawn, a plea of guilty
places a defendant in the same position as a verdict of
a jury finding him guilty of the charge after a fair and
impartial trial (Id. at 385).

Brrm:n v. 'l.'urner, supra, a Utah Supreme Court
case, explains the law regarding the timeliness of a
habeas corpus petition. In the case, the court states:
"If the contention of error is something
which is known or should be known to the party
at the time the judgment was entered, it must
be reviewed in the manner and within the time
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permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack except in unusual circumstances." (Id. at 696).
In view of the fact that both the appellant and
his attorneys have known of the conviction and the
sentence for over seven years, his request to withdraw
cannot be considered timely. There has been no showing of any reason why this issue could not have been
raised on appeal or at )Pnst within a reasonable amount
of time after the sentencing.
Federal Rule 32 ( d), although not binding in this
case, expresses the general rule, that withdrawal of a
plea after sentence has been imposed should only be
allowed to prevent manifest injustice. Hathaway's case
does not meet this standard. He was aware of the conviction and the sentence in ample time to request withdrawal or to perfect an appeal at the time of his plea.
Furthermore, he was allowed to escape almost certain conviction of first degree murder and the death
penalty by pleading guilty to second degree murder.
A refusal to allow him now to withdraw that plea and
again face charges of first degree murder cannot be
deemed manifestly unjust.
On the other hand, it would be manifestly unjust
to the state to force it to go to trial after the passage
of seven years during which much of the evidence and
many of the witnesses may have become unavailable.
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If the court were to allow this, it would encourage the
use of the guilty plea, subsequently withdrawn years
later, as a method to escape justice.

CONCLUSION
The appellant has failed to meet his burden of
proof to show that the trial court's decision to deny the
writ of habeas corpus was not supported by any substantial evidence. Furthermore, his request to withdraw
his guilty plea was not timely nor will the denial of it
result in manifest injustice. The denial of the writ of
habeas corpus should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

Attorney' for Respondent

